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This thesis looks at the Antisubmarine Warfare Systems Evaluation Tool
(ASSET), written by Metron, Incorporated for OP-71, and how it relates to a
current threat environment. ASSET is a campaign level ASW Monte-Carlo
simulation intended for developing ASW Master Plans, top-level war fighting
requirements (TLWRs), appraisals, and assessments. ASSET, delivered in 1990,
was written from a U.S.-Soviet conflict perspective, and needs some restructuring
to be able to provide conflict Measures of Effectiveness using platforms that are
expected in a regional war. Included as suggested improvements are: a
conventional submarine addition with major emphasis on power plant capabilities
and limitations; improvements to the surface group-submarine interaction; and
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I. THE UNPREDICTABLE FUTURE OF ANTISUBMARINE
WARFARE
A. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR STUDY
The last five years have seen major economic, political, and military changes
in the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the greatest of these changes, not
only brought the Cold War to its conclusion, but also forced the Department of
Defense to re-justify its existence in terms of the remaining threats around the
globe. At present there are few powers other than the Russian Republic and
possibly China who can project power to other parts of the globe. With this in
mind, national security, defined in terms of threats to our interests, has begun to
take a higher degree of relevance, as opposed to possible attacks on allies or on
our own shores. Hence was born the regional conflict, the defense planning
priority of the 1990's in terms of defense planning.
One of the areas under the greatest attack is Antisubmarine Warfare.
Previously, it had been one of the U.S. Navy's highest priorities. It was moved
down to reflect the necessity of strike warfare in the regional context, as
illustrated in Operation Desert Storm. Much like nuclear weapons however, the
submarine was and is a weapon that can truly frighten even the largest of powers,
and its proliferation is continuing. The Falklands War demonstrated that even an
unbalanced conflict could be quickly equalized with a single modern diesel
submarine, making it in the views of many countries a tremendous force multiplier.
The impending budget cuts in defense mean that the Department of Defense will
have to do as much with less. In-house planning has the Navy shrinking to 450
ships with 10 to 12 carriers and 50 to 70 submarines. This, critics say, is overly
optimistic, predicting fleet level in the 350 ship range. Co. ering the overhaul
and deployment schedules, the Navy will be lucky to meet the national
commitments placed upon it. The Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies
Group stated in The Future Strategic Environment that:
The absence of a clear, galvanizing threat combined with our
being cash poor, deeply in debt, and uninterested in taxing
ourselves means that we need to plan on the basis of having a
significantly reduced force structure. This will likely continue until
the American public feels threatened by an external force, or until
the U.S. is unable to apply military force in a region of major
national interest -- at which time the American public will once
again demand a bigger defense budget. [Ref. l:p. 23]
The ability of the Navy to be ready for all possible conflicts in the post Cold
War world will be called into question due to limited resources alone. While the
basics of naval warfare will not change greatly, the specifics against a plethora of
possible adversaries vary tremendously. Consider the antisubmarine warfare
case. We know how to perform searches, detect and classify hostile submarines,
and launch weapons. However, we may not know the force capabilities of the
enemy in terms of maintenance, competence, and in certain cases sheer numbers,
due to nothing more than the lack of study. Admiral Sandy Woodward went
down to fight the Argentineans with no good bathymetric charts and depending
on the current edition of Jane's Fighting Ships for a description of the naval
strength [Ref. 2:p. 78]. There may not be a clear picture of the acoustic
conditions, and how our sonars and weapons will perform in this environment. Is
the ambient noise level so high due to merchant shipping the arrays pointed in
certain directions are overwhelmed? Will shallow water conditions impede
operations and shorten detection ranges? Unless the Fleet is going to spend
money practicing in areas where it simply thinks there may be a conflict, which is
unlikely, the only credible alternative is to study the various situations using
pencil, paper, and computers with available data.
There are three objectives to this thesis:
- Describe the ASSET model and review the critiques it has received from
the many organizations that depend on such models for use in the various studies
contracted by the Navy.
- Propose the direction that ASSET should go; that is, to reflect in it the
kind of warfare we will most frequently encounter, regional warfare, instead of
open ocean battle. The regional scenarios are proving to be much more complex
than a lesser included case of blue water warfare.
- Suggest ways to incorporate some basic, necessary, regional features in
the existing architecture.
B. THE ASSET SIMULATION
ASSET is a Monte-Carlo campaign model developed for the Chief of Naval
Operations (OP-71), and is intended for use in developing ASW Master plans, top-
level war fighting requirements (TWLR), appraisals, and assessments. From the
ASSET technical documentation:
ASSET is a totally integrated analysis tool with embedded
models for C3I, undersea and overhead surveillance, submarine
operations, MPA operations, and mine warfare. The program is
structured so that all program features can be used in a mirror-image
fashion to model both Blue and Red capabilities. Both prehostilities
and hostilities are considered; during prehostilities ASW unit
confine operations to track and trail. During hostilities, weapon
release is authorized, and ASW units attempt to convert detections
to kills. [Ref. 3:p. iv]
ASSET was written in the LISP computer language, employing object
oriented programming techniques, in order to allow "modules" of models to be
added or removed depending on the need for them. This is the great advantage
of this programming method, since it sets up a hierarchical relationship between
objects depending on the needs of the simulation. For example, a "submarine"
object could inherit a "sonar" object that has specific detection characteristics.
The drawback to LISP is that it is not widely known and fairly hard to learn.
Other languages such as C and Pascal also have object language extensions, and
are much more commonly known, and may be easier to learn. Future versions of
ASSET will likely be written in C++ for the Sun workstations.
1. What ASSET addresses
As a campaign simulation, ASSET has a lot to offer. The program is large
in scope, including:
- Command, control, communications intelligence networks including
both GENSER and SI message traffic, which are completely customizable by the
user for the scenario;
- Marine patrol aircraft (MPA), including sonobuoy fields, command
structures, maintenance failures, and logistics and maintenance;
- Submarine operations, including sub-on-sub interactions for both
prehostilities and during hostilities, logistics, own ship acoustic parameters,
detection parameters and command structures;
- User definable minefields;
- SURTASS ships, which are included in the C3I network;
- Satellite, and HFDF detections;
- Fixed area sensors, such as a SOSUS array, and tripwires;
- Surface groups, with a group acoustic signature, to serve as targets for
enemy submarines.
Even with this long list of attributes, many could find items that they
would prefer to see added, prior to running their particular scenario. Some
existing functions are also not without problems. This simulation has been under
scrutiny for about two years, and the potential user organizations have compiled
some "wish lists", as well as some criticisms of certain parts of the model.
2. Critiques of ASSET
The ASSET program was submitted to OP-71 in the middle of 1990 for
evaluation and eventual use in the ways mentioned above. OP-71 then passed it
to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) for evaluation and Systems Planning and Analysis (SPA) for practical use, if
possible, in Chief of Naval Operations sponsored studies. Each has looked into
the architecture of the program and found it to have virtues, but all have
mentioned specific deficiencies in the program which could and should be
corrected to provide a more realistic simulation for planning objectives. There is a
good deal of commonalty among the concerns, and from these one can acquire a
general sense for the way that ASSET or a possible successor will need to go to
be more useful in a post-Soviet world.
a. Centerfor Naval Analyses (CNA)
The Center for Naval Analyses has been reviewing the ASSET
model for over a year at the request of OP-71. The report by CNA was completed
in early 1992, and was submitted to Metron for comment. The CNA report review
process requires that reports not be quoted until complete. However, there are
some non-specific areas that some of the CNA analysts had comment on.
Both CNA and OP-71 are looking for a good regional simulation to
replace previous and inferior models. CNA maintains, however, that one
simulation cannot be all things to all people. Simulations as large as ASSET often
make difficult to justify assumptions about how changes on a tactical level affect
an outcome of a battle or a war. The size itself may alone be a major problem.
Modeling assumptions critical to a user may be overlooked in the technical
documentation, not to mention the errors in coding that may stay hidden.
Specific uses are in the designer's mind when the simulation is programmed. For
example, if a user has no interest in a specific and elaborate command, control, and
communications network, there may be serious drawbacks to using ASSET
because a great deal of processing time goes toward the manipulation of the
networks. A similar complexity criticism applies to McDonnell Douglas' SCAT
model. It was built to simulate ASW aircraft tactical performance, but was
extended to include submarine approaches and attacks on a carrier batde group.
SCAT may not be the simulation of choice if simplicity and transparency of the
aircraft and ship modeling is desired.
The lack of communication and defense capability in the surface
groups is also is a major problem. These "punching bag" groups would appear
to preclude the use of ASSET in any study requiring surface interactions.
b. Systems Planning and Analysis (SPA)
Systems Planning and Analysis is a firm that performs many of the
ASW studies for OP-71. In interviews with analysts working there [Ref. 4], other
items were mentioned for desired addition to the current architecture. The first
was the inability of the program to allow a submarine to radiate multiple
frequencies, and thereby be tracked on one or more of them. This would more
closely model reality; tracking is done with the strongest, highest, and most stable
frequency available. Unfortunately, if completely implemented with a decision
algorithm the tracking algorithm would become immensely more complex, slow
the program and would increase many times the amount of data that had to be
entered.
The second desired feature was that of active sonar, preferably a
good model of both high or medium frequency and the upcoming low frequency.
Metron has a scaled back version of ASSET which has a Low Frequency Active
(LFA) model, but was for internal use only, and was not for distribution to OP-71,
and subsequently not to anyone who may need it for analytic work, which may
indicate a weakness in it. Active sonar brings a myriad of problems with it,
including the necessity of modeling target strength, two way transmission loss,
acoustic power, and the determination of noise limited and reverberation limited
cases, false contacts, classification problems, and therefore false prosecutions.
An optional "cookie cutter" model of detection range was also
desired by the analysts at SPA. This would greatly simplify the amount of data
that needed to be entered, since all that would be needed is the maximum range
of detection, and would bypass the entire propagation loss entry procedure. If
the contact was within the given range, detection would occur.
As CNA had mentioned, the lack of a battle group model was also a
serious drawback to the analysts at SPA. Many current studies involve the battle
group and its vulnerability to attack, and the lack of a functional battle group
model made the program unusable, except from a standpoint of counting how
many times the submarine came within weapons/encounter range of the generic
surface group. This is true for both the torpedo and submarine launched cruise
missile cases.
c. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
The Naval Postgraduate School has done to date four theses
involving ASSET, all of which proposed ideas to make the simulation more
realistic.
- Richard M. Shaffer evaluated the MPA detection and allocation
models [Ref. 5]. He concluded that ASSET gains speed by sacrificing some
accuracy at the tactical level in order to keep a reasonable speed of execution in
the program. Sonobuoys were uniformly placed in the search area, negating any
potential benefits from different pattern geometries. To correct this he proposed
two detection models which employed user-selected sonobuoy patterns with
actual buoy locations specified. The first uses a user-defined pattern with a fixed
probability of detection, while the second replaces the continuous sensor field
with a glimpsing sensor. Another problem he noted was that submarines are
constrained to remain inside or outside the MPA search area and were not
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allowed to cross the boundary during the search. Finally, there was no provision
for a relief MPA to maintain contact on a detected submarine.
- Paul W. Vebber analyzed the Kalman Filter based Maneuvering
Target Statistical Tracker embedded in ASSET, and made some suggestions for
improvement [Ref. 6]. He recommended changes aimed at decreasing the
computation time including:
• Use of modified equations to compute the actual filtered
variance and position of the target.
• Filtering the variance of the contact distribution prior to
conducting a random draw, thus producing a position drawn from a
distribution approximating that of the actual filtered position
variance. This allows appropriate values for the sensor areas of
uncertainty to be pre-computed for a range of expected time
intervals.
• Limiting the situations where the filter is actually used to
those which will result in a meaningful amount of information being
extracted.
• Using planar estimations of the latitude and longitude
computations rather than perform the conversions on a "spherical
earth."
- Shawn M. Callahan evaluated detection modeling in ASSET, and
found that the glimpse rate model used could be improved [Ref. 7]. A glimpse
rate, g, is currendy a required ASSET input. Probability of detection can be
highly sensitive to the choice of g. Also change in relative speed, lateral range, or
environmental conditions apparently requires a different g. The many different
possible target trajectories dictate that many different glimpse rates might be
required to derive a consistent probability of detection. To correct this, he
proposed a Lambda-Sigma Glimpse Rate Model which gave the following
advantages:
• Glimpse-to-glimpse correlation of signal excess is provided.
• It approaches the Lambda-Sigma Model as glimpse rate
approaches infinity.
• It maintains the current ASSET glimpse rate structure.
• It provides more realism in the thin convergence zone case.
- Peng-tso Chang actually altered the original ASSET code to
replace the Glimpse Rate Model with the above Lambda-Sigma
Jump Model [Ref. 8]. Additionally, he made the following changes:
• A target's most detectable frequency and detection rate were
allowed to vary with environmental region.
• Multiple engagements between platforms were allowed.
• Richard Shaffer's second model for sonobuoys was
implemented, using a glimpse rate model to determine detection
opportunities of MPA and to approximate a continuous looking
sensor.
• ASSET was modified so that MPA were allocated to SPAs so
as to maximize the ratio of the MPA's time-on-station to the SPA
size. If fuel allowed, the MPA would stay on station after a
submarine prosecution for another detection opportunity.
d. Metron, Inc.
The creators of the model have recognized the need to alter or
expand its capabilities. The programmer, Steve Lent, has written a Programmers
10
Guide [Ref. 9] for the Postgraduate School, including, as examples, two modules
that improve ASSET.
The first improvement allows a variable radiated noise, which
permits detectability to depend on not only the speed of the object and the
environment, but also on transient noise emissions from the platform.
The second improvement is an addition of a measure of
effectiveness (MOE) to record the detection range at the time of detection. Over
many runs, the MOE would allow the computation of an average detection range.
There are other modifications that Metron is working on for the
final version of the Programmer's Guide. The most significant of these is an
maritime patrol aircraft "hand-off model, in which an MPA that must depart due
to logistical reasons, leaves only when a relieving MPA has been cued. This is
much more desirable since a real MPA would not leave the area prior to such a
turnover.
Finally, Metron's comment on the lack of an interactive surface
group was that, while they felt its exclusion was significant, the problem was
simply too complex to address when ASSET was being designed. An adequate
level of detail could not be agreed upon to accurately and completely model the
approach, attack, detection, attack and counterattack of a surface action group.
The thought was that if a measure of effectiveness (MOE) was needed, one could
count torpedoes or detections.
C. SIMULATING AN ASW REGIONAL CONFLICT
Considering all the comments on ASSET, there is an obvious need for some
additions to make it more useful to analysts and to senior officers, and to give
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rapid feedback to a previously unpredictable regional, "green water" scenario.
The primary units in the ASW fight in the future that should be expected are the
torpedo firing, diesel submarine, friendly nuclear submarines, the maritime patrol
aircraft, and some form of surface action group. To take ASSET into this context,
three categories need to be added or modified to reflect the current ASW
battleground.
1. The Conventional Submarine
Probably the simplest of the three additions to implement, the ubiquitous
non-nuclear submarine will be a great threat to a battle group, task force, or
merchant fleet. Its differences from a nuclear submarine are important, not only in
terms of it size and quietness, but also due to the extreme variability of exploitable
detection opportunities, both acoustic and non-acoustic. Future variations in the
power plant configurations, including air-independent propulsion, fuel cells, and
Stirling engines, will make the non-nuclear submarine a very potent threat.
2. The Battle Group
Generally regarded by all reviewers as one of the most incomplete
features of ASSET, the surface group model requires considerable improvement.
This is probably the hardest change to make to ASSET, depending on the level of
detail that is attempted, since it may involve bringing in a battle group or task
force commander, MPA that may operate with the surface group, detection
capabilities of individual units, high value units, and many other factors. As
difficult as these modeling issues are, they should be addressed. The current
modeling of surface forces is very incomplete.
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3. The Detection Methods
The most all-encompassing deficiency is that of detection methods.
With many non-acoustic methods of detection deployed, including radar and
magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), the non-nuclear submarine is and will be
easier to detect than a nuclear submarine. Active sonar should also be modeled,
since quiet submarines may make that the prominent method of acoustic
detection by surface forces in the future.
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINE
One of the most prominent units in the future years that we can expect is the
non-nuclear submarine. Its affordability by ambitious nations and its flexibility
make it the most useful sea denial platform available. To that end, it is crucial that
this platform be considered in future studies and simulations to allow both its
capabilities and vulnerabilities to be taken into account. In its present form,
ASSET does not include a conventionally powered submarine model, only that of
the nuclear powered attack submarine. To use the nuclear powered model and its
parameters would overestimate the ability of the non-nuclear submarine, and
would not give the multiple detection opportunities that its power plant
limitations would allow. The argument can be made, however, that the non-
nuclear submarine capabilities will approach that of the nuclear powered
submarine as more development is made by the exporting countries. In any
event, there are great differences in the two types, where they fight, how they
fight, and their respective vulnerabilities.
A. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CHARACTERISTICS
To see what modifications to ASSET and possibly other simulations would be
necessary to accurately model the operations of a non-nuclear submarine, the
nuclear powered submarine model must be reviewed to see if any parameters are
consistent for both, as well as differences that may need to be expounded on.
While the operations may have similarities, the means and the specific details may
be completely different.
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1. Actual Nuclear Submarine Operations and Characteristics
The nuclear powered submarine has few basic variable external
characteristics that are important in modeling concerns. Since it has the ability to
remain underwater for an extended period of time (greater than three months) due
to the nuclear power plant, atmosphere processing equipment, and water
distillation systems, there is no need for prolonged periods on the surface or at
periscope depth. Also, barring maintenance failures of crucial components, all
speeds obtainable by the submarine can be sustained and are available upon
demand, again by virtue of the power plant. There are a few remarkable elements
to note however, since they involve detection issues that carry over to the non-
nuclear submarine.
Exposure at the surface would only be due to the need to communicate
with the outside world, and that would involve a periscope and possibly an
antenna. This communication period is somewhat fixed, depending on the
schedule to which transmitted messages are repeated and when navigation
satellites are available for precise fixes. The length of this period is highly
variable, depending on the means by which the transmitted, i.e. Ultra High
Frequency (UHF), High Frequency (HF), or Very Low Frequency (VLF). The data
transfer rates at the lower frequencies are slow enough to cause the ship to spend
a great deal of time at periscope depth. The exception to this process is, of course,
the floating wire which is designed for reception of VLF transmissions. The
presence of the wire would permit the submarine to only need to expose a mast
for an active transmission, which in ASSET would only occur for a passive
detection.
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Atmosphere control is also handled within the submarine itself. Oxygen
generators, C02 Scrubbers, and CO-H 2 Burners, take care of most important
atmosphere concerns. Ventilation, although often desired, is not necessary for
crew survival or performance, and therefore is not necessary for modeling
consideration. A non-nuclear submarine may have to consider this possibility, if
snorkeling is not a tactical option, given that battery life is not the limiting
consideration.
Most acoustic detection by the nuclear powered submarine is done
passively via a hull spherical array, a conformal array, or through some type of
towed arrays. Active transmissions through radar or sonar are unwise in a covert
role since they may give away the ship's position or presence, and hence may not
need to be modeled for the submarine object. The passive detection
opportunities are the primary means that submarines have for initial detection,
tracking, localization, classification and targeting. Electronic Support Measures
(ESM) are also extremely important for knowing that a threat or a target is
nearby. These models need to not only exist, but be complete to the degree that
correct action by the submarine commander is taken upon receipt.
The acoustic signature of a nuclear submarine is more pronounced than
that of a typical non-nuclear submarine running on the battery. The coolant
pumps, turbine generators, and various other auxiliary pumps put sufficient sound
in the water to reduce any acoustic advantage over a non-nuclear submarine to
nearly zero. The problem is that the sound will occur in many, different frequency
bands and the tracking algorithm gets proportionally more complex and time
consuming as it comes closer to representing true operations.
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2. ASSET'S Model of a Nuclear Submarine
Figure 1 is a screen copy of the menu which defines in ASSET the object
of a nuclear submarine. It is very comprehensive, to the point of requiring specific
sonar parameters for defining both the ship's sonar and the noise that the ship












O Submarine Weapons 1




O Sub Sub PKs ( )OK
cancel]
Figure 1. Screen shot of ASSET'S Submarine Definition Menu
Communication networks are defined, motion plans are built and
specified (including those for replenishment), weapons loadouts are initialized,
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target types are established, and sub versus sub probability of kills are tabulated.
Both the class and specific platforms are edited from this menu.
There are some somewhat serious problems with the model of the
nuclear submarine in ASSET. Only two speeds can be defined with their
corresponding signature noise levels at a single frequency. By allowing only two
speeds the programmer is taking from the simulation the option a commander
would have to use only the speed required to complete the attack, in order to
retain as much stealthiness as possible. Also, only allowing the submarine to
attack px trail either surface ships o_r other submarines invalidates the entire
flexibility of the modern attack submarine to choose the target of opportunity.
Finally the probability of kills are generic for one type of submarine against
another. No consideration is made for condition situations which may alter the
outcome probabilities, such as who detects first, salvo tactics, attacker bearing
relative to the target or a host of other considerations. This would require more
data entry, but may reflect the true outcome of the melee, and its conditional
dependence on how it is entered.
B. BASIC CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINE CHARACTERISTICS
Any country that operates submarines regularly has a variety of platforms
and capabilities and sizes in its fleet. This is true in both nuclear fleets and in the
non-nuclear fleets. Despite this, there are many commonalties within each type of
platform. Table 1 relates the basic configurations of the most common or modern
submarines that may be encountered.
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TABLE 1. COMMON NON-NUCLEAR SUBMARINES AND THEIR
B>KSIC CA PABILITIES [Ref. 10]
SUBMARINE Displ. Length(m) Beam(m) Subm Torpedo Tubes/ Surfaced Subm Depth
tons Speed(kt) Torpedoes Range(NM Range[NM) (m)










TYPE 209 1210 54.5 6.2 21.5 8 - 53 cm 250
(1100) 14
TYPE 209 1285 55.9 6.3 22 8 - 53 cm 6000 400 @ 4kn 250
(1200) 14 @ 8 knots 230 @ 8kn
TYPE 209 1850 64.4 6.5 22 8 - 53 cm 13000 260
(1500) 14 @ 10 knot
'







DAPHNE 1038 57.8 6.8 16 8 - 53/55 cm(f)







This table shows the large variety of platforms distributed throughout the
world. We see in this table that the possible threats come in a wide variety of
sizes, ranges, and weapons. In all cases the power plant and battery determine
the overall level of threat posed by these ships.
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Analysis of the non-nuclear submarine require details not needed for the
nuclear submarine analysis. Most of these are related to detectability issues that
are a function of the limitations of the power plant and the variability of noise
levels.
The power plant is the key to the performance of the ship: The combination
of the diesel engines and large, specially designed batteries. Since there is an
electric drive, submerged propulsion is extremely quiet and hard to detect. In this
propulsion method, however, is the limitation of how far and how fast the battery
is discharged. If a high tactical speed is desired, the total energy in the battery
available is consumed much faster than if a slow speed was ordered, roughly on
the order on the cube of the speed. To recharge the battery snorkeling at
periscope depth or on the surface is required, since this is the only method of
placing energy in the battery.
During the recharging process, the submarine is to a large degree noisier than
its submerged running mode, exposes a large mast to radar detection, and puts a
fair amount of waste heat energy into the water.
The primary issue that therefore needs to be addressed is to derive a good
approximation to a battery-diesel propulsion system. If one was to assume a
simple indiscretion rate model, that is,
indiscretion rate (%) = time spent snorkeling / time in transit x 100%
where the submarine snorkeled for some fixed percentage of the day, then no
consideration would be given to energy limitations on the battery when running
at various speeds and force snorkeling even if there is an imminent threat. The
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only good way to investigate the vulnerability and the flexibility of the non-
nuclear submarine is to model, as completely as possible, the power plant and
battery combination. If the power plant is modeled, the detectability and threat
concerns will fall out as natural functions of how often it would have to snorkel,
and how far and how fast it could go.
C. NECESSARY MODELING CONSIDERATIONS FOR A
CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINE
The goal of a model of a foreign non-nuclear submarine is that the model
should be simple, accurate, and utilize data that is available to the analyst. If the
model is complete, but requires some great level of detail requiring highly
classified data, the model will get little use. In the development of a propulsion
methodology the major sources are Jane's Fighting Ships and some unclassified
documents from the foremost non-nuclear submarine designer, Howaldtswerke-
Deutsche Werft (HDW) [Ref. 11] and the complimentary battery designer Hagen
[Ref. 12]. This is necessary so that ASSET can remain an unclassified model that
is not prohibitively hard to use due to inaccessibility.
1. Propulsion and Speed Issues
In a non-nuclear submarine model, speed is a function of tactical
necessity, initial charge level of the battery, number of alternators available for
power transfer, and the amount of energy the electric propulsion motor is able to
draw to put energy in the water. In the more advanced submarines that are
testing air-independent propulsion (AIP) methods, the input of this auxiliary
power plant can provide enough energy to indefinitely remain submerged,
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though the submarine may be limited by the need for navigational data,
communication information, or the submarine atmosphere.
Since this "function" has so many variables and is very complex, the
simplest method of modeling a non-nuclear submarines is from analyzing actual
data. Most standard parameters of a particular submarine can be obtained from
Jane's as shown in Table 1. Although actual submarine performance is hard to
obtain, HDW will upon request put out a fact sheet including submerged ranges
at given speeds for the Type 209 (1200), while Hagen will provide battery energy
characteristics at specified discharge levels.
Tom Stefanick put forth in Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and
Naval Strategy a method [Ref. 13:pp. 141-145] by which non-nuclear submarine
range can be predicted. The first step is to compute the power consumed by skin
friction drag on the submarine as it moves through the water at various speeds.
The equation he uses to predict this amount of power is:
"-&
where U is the speed of the submarine in knots, K is a constant (25 for single
screw ships), Psis the shaft horsepower, L is the length in feet, and D is the
diameter of the submarine in feet. This power, in combination with "hotel loads"
(those loads comprising lighting, sonar, and computer power and other non-
propulsion electrical loads), battery weight, and the specific energy capacity of
the battery will allow the prediction of the running time of the submarine at a
specific speed. This is done adding all the power required to operate the
submarine, finding how much energy the battery contains, and the dividing the
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power needed by the battery energy to find out the running time. The weak spot
in the method are the assumptions that battery weight is a fixed
percentage of the total tonnage of the submarine which can be
overcome if more specific data on the submarine is available.
The key assumption in this method is the value for the specific energy in the
battery. Although his was not designed to be a dynamic model, Stefanick
assumes a median value for a typical German submarine battery. The numbers for
specific energy are not that easy to pin down for a variety of speeds, and range
from 20 to 50 watt-hours/kilogram for the same battery for different discharge
rates. Figure 2 below shows the power available from the battery for a specific
discharge rate, normalized for weight computed from the Hagen data. Also, this





























Figure 2. Power Available from the Battery at Various Discharge Rates
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Please note that Figure 2 has the time divided out from the ordinate, to
show how well the curve has been fit, and the units are therefore watts/kilogram.
If time is kept in Figure 2, then the graph would show more energy available at
longer discharge times (or another way, lower discharge rates).
Since we do have the specific energy curve for a typical German battery,
one approach to predicting submarine performance might be to simply apply the
curve that can be fit to the battery energy data to Stefanick's method.
Unfortunately, looking at the Type 209 (1200) data, the curves bear little
similarity to each other. The explanation for this lies in the nonlinearities that lie
between the battery and the propeller, in terms of energy flow. Propeller
efficiency, electrical losses, and other losses will skew the prediction. Another
problem with this method is that the time discharge rate and the actual time that
the battery is discharged are not always the same. A more reasonable approach
would be to take a submarine performance curve, fit a function to it, take out the
specific details of that particular submarine, and then use the resulting "specific
energy" curve to predict other submarine behaviors.
We will take data provided by HDW on the performance of the Type
209 (1200) and normalize it by going backwards through Stefanick's method to
find the specific energy characteristic of a generic battery, with appropriate non
calculable considerations thrown in. Table 2 contains these calculations. The
first two columns contain the data as obtained from the HDW document, adding
new entries for an expanded table. In the third column, we took the data and fit
to it the closest function possible, by the method in the CRC Standard
Mathematical Tables [Ref. 14:p. 510], to make a function from which any speed
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input will give the submerged run time. The resulting function, was an
exponential curve of the form:
Submerged Time =(266.20536)(.775788)sPeed



















2 160.21 1.69 51.69 31.70
4 96.42 13.52 63.52 23.44
4.5 91.1 84.93 19.24 69.24 22.51
6 61.7 58.03 45.61 95.61 21.24
8 33.7 34.93 108.12 158.12 21.14
10 21.02 211.18 261.18 21.01
12 10.8 12.65 364.92 414.92 20.09
14 7.61 579.48 629.48 18.34
16 4.37 4.58 864.99 914.99 16.05
18 2.76 1231.60 1281.60 13.53
20 1.66 1689.44 1739.44 11.05
21 1.42 1.29 1955.74 2005.74 9.89
22 1.00 2248.65 2298.65 8.79
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The fourth column is a computation of the power required to drive the
submarine from the Stefanick equation with a straight 85% propeller efficiency
figured in. The fifth column is this power plus 50 KW of hotel loads from the
HDW sheet. Finally, the sixth column is the conversion of the power required by
the submarine at each speed to the normalized energy of watt- hour/kilogram, with
the stated remaining charge of 20% divided out. The computation was the fifth
column converted to watts, multiplied by the time of the battery run, divided by
the 80% of the weight of the battery (to account for remaining energy). Below is
the Figure 3 which shows how the specific energy relates to speed.
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Figure 3. Resulting Normalized Battery "Specific Energy" Curve
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Notice that the hotel loads at the lower speeds rival and beat the power
needed to drive the submarine, which accounts for the nonlinearity in the graph.
Now that we have a curve for the submarine's energy, we will want to
apply this to another submarine to see how ASSET might use this data to give a
reasonable motion model. From Jane's there is data regarding the KILO class
non-nuclear submarine:
Weight: 3076 tons
Dimensions: 243.8 x 32.8 feet
We will assume, as Stefanick does, that battery weight is 20% of ships
weight, that we will only run to 80% discharge on the battery, and that hotel
loads on this large ship require 100 kilowatts. All calculations have been
performed in Table 3. The first calculation is to use the Stefanick equation to
determine the power to drive the ship and divide by 0.85 to account for propeller
efficiency. Next, add 100 to that number to account for hotel loads which gives
the total power. Finally, take the value from our "specific energy" curve for a
desired speed, multiply it by 80% of the battery weight in kilograms and divide
by the total power required. The result is the run time at that speed. Figure 4 is a
graph of the results of our sample computation. The results appeal- reasonable.
Now, knowing the speed and time allowed by the battery, points can be
computed by ASSET where the submarine would have to come to periscope
depth to begin snorkeling.
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TABLE 3. COMPUTATION OF THE RUN TIME OF A KILO CLASS










2 40.06 4.82 104.82 170.64
4 31.42 38.53 138.53 101.26
4.5 30.80 54.87 154.87 88.80
6 30.86 130.05 230.05 59.89
8 32.57 308.28 408.28 35.62
10 33.50 602.10 702.10 21.30
12 32.63 1040.43 1140.43 12.77
14 30.12 1652.16 1752.16 7.68
16 26.52 2466.20 2566.20 4.61
18 22.44 3511.45 3611.45 2.77
20 18.38 4816.80 4916.80 1.67
21 16.46 5576.05 5676.05 1.29




























Figure 4. Results of the Run Time Prediction of the Kilo Class Submarine
2. Detectability Issues
From the shallow submarine comes opportunities for detection. To
model these opportunities, all that should need to be input would be depth at
which the submarine snorkels, a time limit on the crew for atmosphere ventilation,
and the amount of noise, in terms of source level, that the diesel makes.
3. Additional Power Plant Concerns
Figure 5 is a diagram from the Hagen Battery pamphlet which shows a
typical operation on a standard diesel electric submarine. It is significant because
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it shows that the ship will transition to periscope depth fairly often to snorkel for
battery recharging. It may not actually represent every detail but since it is from
submarine battery designers, these most likely represent the parameters from
which the battery was designed.
The question for the model is to what degree the variations in speed can
be modeled. A battery will put out more energy on a slow discharge than on a
rapid discharge, and this is reflected in the battery specific energy. But to make
the speed transition in a simulation requires that an assumption be made on how
much of the battery is left to discharge. One way to do this is to use the kilowatt-







Figure 5. Example Diesel Submarine Operating Profile
Given there is some level to which the battery should not be discharged
below (as in 80% in the calculations above), knowing how long the submarine
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was run at some speed can be converted to kilowatt-hours. Knowing the original
battery specific energy, multiplying it by the original weight of the battery will
result in total kilowatt-hours. The used portion can be subtracted from the
original portion to yield remaining kilowatt-hours. Knowing the next speed will
take the calculation into a new specific energy and total energy to compute time
available at that speed. The kilowatt-hours left are known, the kilowatts required
to drive the sub at a speed are known, and from those time left on the battery at a
speed can be determined. This can be repeated for a different speed. The end will
come when the kilowatt-hours are used and the submarine snorkels or sinks. At
the point of snorkeling, the submarine should shift to a louder source level and
use a transmission loss curve computed for this shallow source.
As for air independent propulsion, the contributions of each system are
given in kilowatts. Since we know the power to drive the sub at some speed, the
AIP system's contribution is merely subtracted from the total power required to
drive the submarine. The battery's kilowatt-hours are then used to find the time at
this speed. This is not entirely an accurate approximation, since the drain on the
battery will be much less, and therefore the total output in kilowatt-hours of the
battery will be much higher.
4. Future Technology Considerations
In the near future, many technological improvements will have been
made to the non-nuclear submarine. The AIP systems may become much more
commonplace, allowing almost constant submerged operations. Atmosphere
processing equipment and precision navigation equipment will become
necessities as the time underwater increases. As the captain of the U-l noted
3 1
debriefing a 44 hour test of the new fuel cell system "During a submerged transit I
felt the urgent need to be able to dispose of a navigation system independent of
the periscope depth." Also in the offing are extra acid batteries, fluctuating
snorkel masts, automation of the control surfaces, and permanent magnetic
motors. These should be minor tweaks to an established non-nuclear model.
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III. THE SURFACE GROUP
A. THE EXPECTED ROLE OF THE BATTLE GROUP IN U.S. DEFENSE
Most experts see the aircraft carrier's role in power projection remaining well
into the future, but not necessarily always being the center of every battle group.
In "The Way Ahead," Former Secretary of the Navy Garrett states:
Our carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are the
cornerstones of our forward deployed forces, and will remain so.
These supremely independent forces can be tailored to include
varying numbers and mixes of tactical aircraft, surface combatants,
submarines, logistic support ships, and Marine air-ground task
forces...During the 1990's we expect to adjust the composition of
our carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups routinely, to
suit specific situations. ..Often, we will be operating with smaller
battle groups, particularly as our older surface combatants are
replaced by fewer- but more capable cruisers, amphibious ships, and
destroyers. [Ref. 15]
In fact, the crucial groups of the future conflict may not be the carrier group
at all, instead simply merchants. Much of the future threat discussion is centered
on the vulnerability of various types of surface ships to third world submarines.
On the other hand, the battle group of the future may not have the ASW
capability that the present groups do. If one goes to a missile cruiser as the center
of the group, then already a good number of MPA have been immediately
removed from consideration.
The representation of a surface group, whatever its composition, in a
campaign simulation is crucial. The continuing use of surface groups in high
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visibility power projection roles with strict rules of engagement makes them a
high payoff target to a would-be attacker. The loss or damaging of any ship in a
relatively small conflict would be an extremely high price to pay, and
consequently, the vulnerability prior to the conflict must be ascertained. The first
merchant that ends up on the bottom would cripple trade in the area for a
prolonged period, as others would not dare to venture in to a proven hostile area.
As was mentioned earlier, the specifics can be wildly different from one scenario
to another, but the surface interaction is going to be integral to the conflicts of
the future.
B. ASSET 1.0 AND SURFACE ENGAGEMENTS
The initial version of ASSET has a very simple surface model. A surface
group has four basic parameters that define it. Figure 6 is a screen shot of the
introductory screen by which this definition process begins. The surface
formation, like the submarine, is primarily an acoustic radiator with a motion plan.
A source level is defined for a slow and a fast running speed at one particular
frequency. The formation will follow an exact motion plan that is specified by the
user in an earlier phase of the simulation setup in which a track to follow is
precisely laid out. The surface formation may patrol in an area or transit. There is
no way to specify number of units in the formation that may be subject to
engagement. There are instead rules defining how the encounter will proceed and
a definition of the measure of effectiveness on the encounter. The ASSET
Technical Documentation defines the surface engagement MOE to be the total
number of engagements of surface forces by opposing submarines up to a
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specified point. There is a user defined critical range at which the submarine is








Figure 6. Surface Formation Definition Menu
Also, the Antisurface Warfare (ASuW) Intercept Threshold is defined as the
amount of time that a submarine which detects a surface formation will take to
attempt to intercept it, i.e. get to the critical range. These numbers are generic for
any submarine-surface ship engagement for each side. Figure 7 is the menu by
which general motion parameters are defined. Most of the blocks are self-
explanatory. The Patrol Speed and Patrol Leg Time are the parameters of motion
that ASSET uses to generate motion within a user defined patrol region. The
Patrol Speed is the speed at which the surface group moves when it is in a region
in its motion plan. Patrol Leg is the parameter of an exponential distribution for
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the time between course changes when the submarine is on patrol in a region. In
the surface formation definition, however, intercept speed is unused since the
formation has no detection capabilities defined, and therefore will not pursue the
submarine. The navigation block defines a "1" if the motion plan specified is a













Figure 7. General Motion Parameters for ASSET Surface Formation
For any form of attack in the present version of ASSET, the submarine which
makes a detection closes into the user specified parameter of critical range as long
as he is not in an tail chase that lasts longer than the threshold specified by the
user. Once at the critical range, the submarine will launch cruise missiles or
torpedoes up to the limits set in the submarine definition, and then will disengage.
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A serious weakness is that the submarine may then re-detect the surface
formation and move in again to repeat the attack. Since no surface ships sink, no
counterattack is made, no alert message is sent to the C3I network, and no effort
is made to attack, hold down, or evade the submarine, it is artificial and unrealistic
for continual re-attacks on the battle group. Realistically, even an unescorted
merchant ship or convoy would send a submarine position report to both MPA
and other ASW forces.
C. NEW VULNERABILITIES IN A REGIONAL SETTING
Knowing what ASSET cannot handle, let us look at what a good campaign
model should be able to handle to cover the details of future conflicts. Some
features have been pointed out above that would be nice to incorporate, such as
communication networks, detection capabilities, and some reasonable amount of
ASW and anti-ship missile defense (ASMD). Certain aspects of the regional
conflict expose more glaring and serious defects in the model for the CALOW7
Low Intensity Conflict study. We will first describe the environment and then
show the ASW play that is needed.
1. The Multi-level threat
The task force or battle group commander must be prepared to deal with
a multi-level threat: attacks from the surface, above it and below it. To take all
into consideration is a difficult task in reality, as it is in a campaign level model.
Screens are often defined from a singular predominant threat, and are weaker in
dealing with other threat axes and types, such as a anti-air warfare/ anti-surface
screen might not be optimized for ASW. In regional war this problem is nothing if
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not exacerbated. Being closer to the enemy's home waters, with specified rules of
engagement that allow no fire unless fired upon, the problem becomes much more
difficult. The threat axis close to a coastline could be anywhere along that coast.
All enemy weapons, even the short range conventional submarines can be
brought to bear. No longer will the U.S. have the luxury of standing off outside
the maximum range weapons if aircraft have to fly deep inside the country to get
at the objectives of the war.
From the ASW standpoint, the multilevel threat means that the
distraction level in the surface group will be very high. With an informal national
priority not to tolerate the loss of lives in combat overseas, many of the future
scenarios will focus on use of missiles and air power to quickly overwhelm enemy
air and ground forces and meanwhile maintaining a tight defensive posture. The
assumption is that unless there is some perceived direct submarine threat or
unaccounted for local submarines, then submarine defense will be more point
defense, instead of actively going out and attempting to locate and destroy.
Resources that one could normally commit to a strict submarine problem may also
have other more pressing uses. For instance, a carrier's flight deck may not have
the capability to handle large numbers of fixed wing ASW aircraft on top of an
already pressing strike. This is assumption is good for a simulation, since it allows
only ASW in the task force or battle group itself, and not externally reaching
MPA from the battle group. However, limits may have to be imposed on the
ability of the group to conduct self defense operations, based on the need for
strike missions or AAW.
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2. Effect of Sustained MODLOC
In combination with the multi-level threat is the need to be in a fairly
restricted area for a sustained period, be it self imposed or due to geographical
constraints. One of the primary vulnerabilities of surface units is the ability to
have their position determined with adequate scouting measures, and since they
do not move very fast (relative to aircraft and missiles), their position can be
tracked fairly easily. In a constrained environment, this problem is much worse.
For example, if ships are needed to remain in the Persian Gulf, or in the far eastern
part of the Mediterranean to support air operations, this alone makes them
vulnerable to units that can fix and report their position. Also, if electronic
emissions control is not maintained, which is not likely in an air operations
environment, then one should expect exploitation of this signal intelligence to aid
in fixing the location of the formation, as well as drawing in searching units,
including submarines with quality ESM receivers.
If the area is acoustically shallow, detection of quiet submarines will be
virtually prohibited. This, in combination with a prolonged stay, may mean
certain trouble for the surface group.
3. Effect of Non-nuclear powered, Torpedo Firing Submarines
The conventional submarine brings a profound threat to the regional
battle. Not only is it an extremely quiet platform, but also carries a solid punch in
the form of its heavyweight torpedoes. Putting this platform in an acoustically
difficult area may result in ASW defenses chasing many false targets.
Due to the conventional submarine's quiet nature and small aspect,
active sonar will most likely have to be employed to find it. The environment for
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active sonar will be just as hostile as it is for passive sonar, complicated by the
shallow environment reverberation, and high and variable ambient noise. False
targets will abound, and there will be a good deal of wasted ordnance, as there
was in the Falklands War. The shallow environment for a campaign model, like
ASSET, is difficult to model properly to simulate the real world.
The limitations on the battery will force snorkeling at various periods
allowing detection by passive acoustic buoy fields and other passive ship borne
sensors. The proximity of the non-nuclear submarine to the surface while making
noise from its diesel engine will make it extremely vulnerable to detection. This
feature must be modeled in ASSET to exploit the vulnerability.
D. PROPERTIES OF AN ADEQUATE MODEL OF THE SURFACE
GROUP-SUBMARINE INTERACTION
Next, we consider what would be involved if ASSET were to contain a model
of the interaction between the submarine and the surface group, including its
ASW screen. For example, if the scenario to be examined is that a task force or
battle group has to go into an area that has 2 to 5 submarines deployed at
unknown locations off of a foreign coast, then we are likely to be curious as to
the vulnerability of the ships that we send. We may plan to send in advance
submarines and MPA to locate and destroy as many as we can in a fixed period of
time, before the carriers arrive, and continue after they are on station. If a
submarine closes to the critical range, we have (over a good number of iterations)
a fairly good idea of how susceptible the formation is to attack, and how effective
our pre-arrival attrition was. While this may not be satisfactory over a prolonged
scenario by not allowing multiple submarine-surface interactions, it may be
sufficient to a tailored specific scenario, if the enemy's victory hinges on getting
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close to a ship to take a shot. To bring this interaction into ASSET many
assumptions have to be made on the nature of the approach and the attack. As
an example, imagine how a submarine would make a torpedo attack on a task
force or battle group:
- The submarine detects the battle group acoustically. At this point, the
submarine makes the determination whether or not the group can be caught, let
alone attacked. In the case of the conventional submarine, this decision is much
more critical, since catching up might mean the unacceptable expenditure of most
of the energy in the battery. Since ASSET does a pursuit calculation knowing
the preset transit speed for the surface formation, the submarine's decision will be
perfect, which is unrealistic.
- The submarine begins the pursuit. The choice of course to pursue is
important since the detected unit of the formation may be on the "fringe", and the
direction of course may not lead to the heart of the formation. At some point,
acoustic counterdetection will be possible, in which case the formation may
become alert to the approach of a submarine. Also, the submarine will most likely
choose to visually identify the unit(s) that he is approaching. Putting up a
periscope may subject the submarine to some form of nonacoustic detection and
also increase the probability of active sonar detection.
- As the submarine approached the group, the submarine would try to
avoid the detection range of any outer screen ships, although he may not be
aware of the presence of every unit. Consequently, a very slow approach may be
dictated. In combination with that would be the avoidance of the first line of
defense, the MPA deployed from the ships. The sensors that they would employ
would be both acoustic (dipping sonars, sonobuoys) and nonacoustic (magnetic
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anomaly detection, radar, ESM, and possibly Lidar in the future). Given certain
ocean conditions and the location of the submarine relative to shore, acoustic and
visual conditions may be poor for detection. The effective sweep width of the
nonacoustic sensors on the aircraft is highly variable, and at least extremely depth
dependent. Given one aircraft against one submarine and given detection has
occurred, some value of the probability of kill would need to be available for use
in these models to compute the combat result, assuming these values have been
computed using practical data.
- Assuming the submarine is able to pass beyond where the aircraft is
pauolling, the next gate would be to pass through the outer screen of surface
ships, now that the submarine maybe within detection range of one or more units.
If the units are searching passively, the searching units position becomes a guess
for the submarine, as well giving the surface ship a low probability of detection.
If active sonar is being employed, the submarine will have a very good idea as to
the position of the ships. Since they are closer to the center, it will be harder to
avoid them than the aircraft. If they detect, one should assume the detecting unit
and possibly others close by would be tasked to intercept and destroy the
incoming submarine, along with a close MPA. The main body of the task force or
other high value units in the formation would also move away from the submarine
datum. Computing this probability of kill would be a task. Would their collective
efforts make them more effective, or is it possible that they could mutually
interfere with each other, making the collective attack worse than if just one of
them had attacked? Also, the cornered submarine may decide his most effective
attack is at this point, taking out one or more of the attackers. Even if successful,
it is not likely that the submarine would be a threat to the main body.
42
- Again assuming no detection, the submarine would continue into an
inner screen of ships and helicopters employing active sonar. It is tighter than the
previous screens. The analysis problem is the same as that for the previous layer.
How is the post detection combat resolved? To allow the probability of kill to be
equal to the combined Pk assuming independence would not allow for interfering
ship noise in the water. On the other hand assuming interdependence would
understate the effects of coordinated ASW and the possibility of cutting off
escape routes and repeated attacks.
- Finally, if the submarine gets to the high value unit and shoots toipedoes,
the post-attack prosecution at the "flaming datum" must be taken into account.
The submarine's escape from the battle group or task force will be much harder
than his approach. Many or most of the ASW ships will have to use active sonar
search continuously against the non-nuclear submarine threat.
The above sequence shows the extreme complexity of minimum modeling of
the submarine actions against a surface formation. Even in this brief example, a
great deal of other detail has been glossed over. Communication, coordination,
and weapon limitations are also often important.
In its present form, ASSET is unusable for surface formations or SURTASS
ship interaction analysis. With no threat to it, the attacking submarine is free to
fire its entire torpedo inventory into the formation, and then go back home for
another loadout. Since the MOE in ASSET is the number of successful
approaches, recorded when a submarine reaches a critical range, the ASSET
model's submarine can attack, go away, re-detect, and come in and repeat the
attack. Each re-detection is counted as an approach. Given a modest detection
and communication capability, this MOE would only approach a realistic value
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for formations with no defensive capability. Some scheme to represent attrition
and evasion of both submarines and surface formations is needed if ASSET is to
be sufficiently valid to be credible.
E. ALTERNATE WAYS TO TREAT THE SUBMARINE-SURFACE
INTERACTIONS WITH ASSET
There are a few ways to better model the interaction. All involve some
degree of changing ASSET'S code, and as expected, the more realistic the
interaction that is desired, the more complex the task of altering the code. The
modifications cover many extremes from keeping ASSET mostly as it is to
modeling all units. The proposed changes include: use lower level models to
"feed" ASSET the probability rules of the interaction; stop the interaction at the
first detection, by either the submarine or the surface formation; model each unit
in the formation, including realistic ASW capabilities; and finally keep the
formation as a single unit, but give it the aggregate capabilities of all units in the
formation.
In the "hierarchy of models", smaller scale models feed into larger scale ones
so that both the speed of analysis is kept high and the detail that is in the lower
level model can be used in the higher level one. Once the submarine reaches the
critical range to the surface formation, the process by which we arrive at the
outcome of the battle is irrelevant. We are concerned with:
1) Was the submarine sunk or damaged or escape?
2) Was a high value unit sunk?
3) Did any other surface units get sunk and how many?
4) How many weapons has the submarine expended?
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5) After detection or flaming datum, what is the presumed
position of the submarine for MPA or other ASW forces
to react to?
If there was a lower level model that would output answers for the specifics
of the battle, then the obvious answer is to use that method for the combat
resolution. The problem then arises of how specific the analyst needs to be for
the campaign results. If he does not care about details such as how the surface
formation is arranged, the propagation paths available in the local area, or ambient
noise levels, then the running of the lower level model to get statistically
significant data may prove too laborious a task. The approximations may then fall
on ASSET so as to ease the job of the analyst in the data search and input.
Adding any routines to ASSET other than the simple probability answers to the
questions above will make the entire program much slower, and the results more
questionable due to the new built-in assumptions. Therefore the additions must
be minimized, the most effective only implemented.
On the other end of the spectrum would be to avoid the entire issue of how
effective the submarine was against the surface group and vice versa. If the MOE
of number of approaches to the critical range is sufficient then that may be all that
he or she needs to know. The major correction to the scenario would have to
involve when the program would halt an iteration and go on to the next one. If
the goal of analysis is to determine the vulnerability of surface formations to a
local submarine, the easiest fix may be to simply stop the iteration at the point at
which the critical range is reached, saving as a data file the range at which initial
detection occurred, time of initial detection and at critical range, and the axis from
where the threat finally occurred.
45
If either of these extremes are still not satisfactory, then a series of
compromises is required. One idea might be to make each single surface unit a
"super submarine" with almost all abilities, and then set up a formation of these
units under a Commander. This separate central Commander object would be
similar to the SUBOPAUTH or ASWOC in the ASSET model. This object would
control the ships and aircraft in the task force/battle group, control the allocation
of combat assets to a threat, any specifics on MPA attached to the group, just as
the other senior level command objects do. Each ship would be essentially a non-
submerging submarine with detection, communication, and combat capabilities, as
well as the capacity of being destroyed. The detection networks could be set up
to report contacts, even false alarms, to the Commander object for allocation to
combat. The problems with this particular method would be the degree to which
the program would be slowed to account for all the units, and the vast amount of
setup required, including ships locations within the formation. Also, there is no
mechanism for mutual acoustic interference, which would hinder detection by
some units in the formation. There is no good way, as mentioned above, to
determine how effective joint attacks would be against the closing submarine. If
one knew all the unit-on-unit Pk's, then an approximation could made using the
half and half rule or some other method to show the attack is not completely
without mutual interference.
Another compromise would be just to make the surface formation a single
unit, for instance a carrier, representing the entire group and give it the composite
abilities of all members of the group. If the user subscribes to the theory that
without the carrier (or amphibious ship or merchant) the group is essentially
useless, then sinking the "formation" would mean the destruction of the carrier,
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and the group would no longer count. In truth, the remaining vessels would have
a great deal of worth, and still may draw off enemy submarines. The abilities of
the "super-carrier" would be hard to determine however, on the order of having
to run a lower level model to fix the groups defensive strength. Detection
capabilities of the super unit would be at best large cookie cutter model, or
sections of a circle that would be difficult to incorporate in the model as data
entry.
F. CONCLUSIONS
There is probably no good way to model the surface interaction with ASSET.
The best way is to get inputs from lower level models if available and just attrite
the surface groups and submarines on each interaction. The easiest way is to alter
the code to end an iteration of the simulation on a submarine approach to the
critical range, recording the circumstances of the interaction. To make any other
compromises may be satisfying to the user but would not be operationally
accurate.
The solution to the surface interaction for ASSET is a combination of the best
and the easiest ways. Give the user a choice as to how he wants the interaction
resolved in the umpire menu; either choose to stop the interaction at the point of
first detection or define the surface formation with the answers to the questions
of ASW capability asked earlier. This way the user can look at the attrition
process prior to the interaction, or look at multiple interactions with his own data
of ASW capability. Since there exist many analysis estimates as to how the battle
group will perform from many, many research institutions, any of those data
inputs could be used in table lookup form. The combination of the two methods
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would keep ASSET viable, if both processes could be incorporated into the
program since either would be "good enough" in a certain analysis.
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IV. METHODS OF DETECTION
Detection is the single most important phase of the ASW battle. If the
submarine remains undetected up to the time of the attack, then its mission most
likely has been a success. For that reason alone, each ASW platform has multiple
methods to search and detect submarines. Some do no more than confirm the
initial detection by another sensor, but all attempt to verify that a submarine has
been found.
The struggle for new, secure and foolproof methods of submarine detection
have been ongoing since early in the century and has been the direction for major
funding since World War II. Concentrated efforts continue, with esoteric, high
risk projects studied to make the oceans transparent. Acoustic detection is still
the best area search method available to the Navy and undoubtedly will be the
prominent method in the future as well.
In a complete simulation, the detection methods used by all platforms on both
sides would be completely and realistically depicted. ASSET uses only passive
sonar for acoustic detection, and communications interception for nonacoustic
detection. Satellite radar is available for the detection of surface groups for use
by submarines, but satellites are hard to deal with since many of their parameters
are classified to a high level. Many methods such as magnetic anomaly detection
(MAD), lidar, and bioluminescence detection are waiting in the wings, but may be
impractical and insignificant in a computer simulation, given the amount of detail
that some methods may require, which would greatly slow computation routines .
Detection is such a significant part of the battle that it must be continually
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reviewed to see if it is represents detection in the best way possible, and if a good
method must be represented, then the detail will have to follow.
This chapter will attempt to focus on the numerous detection methods that
may be covered in a campaign level simulation. Some methods are completely
necessary, such as some sort of conventional active sonar model on surface ships.
Others, such as radar, can be subverted by a target submarine, and just may not be
worth the effort of installing in the program. Some may just fall into a middle
ground where they are good to have, but do not have a significant impact in the
simulation.
A. SUBMARINE BASED DETECTION METHODS
Submarines have three major sensors: sonar, radar, and electronic support
measures (ESM). The submarine's major and most effective sensor is the passive
sonar system, and though she can go active, rarely does for fear of
counterdetection of the energy that is put in the water. There is radar, used
normally while the submarine is on the surface, which is can be even more
detectable than an active sonar transmission. Finally, there are electronic support
measures receivers onboard, allowing for detection of electromagnetic signals
throughout the spectrum. The three allow give the submarine enough flexibility
to be quite a formidable sea-denial platform.
1. Sonar
A submarine's sonar generally manifests itself in a forward hull array,
usually cylindrical or spherical in shape, and sometimes in more advanced types, a
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towed line array. The forward array has both active and passive capabilities,
while the towed array is strictly passive.
Like the rest of the objects in ASSET with a detection capability, it will
be necessary to enable the submarine to go into an acoustically shallow area to
conduct operations. From this perspective we must look at the implementation of
the passive sonar model in ASSET and see how it might be adapted for shallow
water.
a. Passive Sonar in ASSET
To understand the passive sonar environment, it is helpful to review the
passive sonar equation to see where deep water assumptions are affected by a
shallow water environment. We, of course, desire to keep the data entry and
assumptions to a minimum, and to try to use as much of the existing ASSET
framework as possible.
The passive sonar equation is:
SIGNAL EXCESS = SL - TL - (NL - DI) - DT
where SL = source level of the noise
TL = one-way transmission loss or propagation loss
NL = noise level, the power sum of self noise and ambient
noise
DT = detection threshold
DI = directivity index
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For easier use by ASSET, this is expressed as:
SIGNAL EXCESS(t) = FOM - TL(Range(t))
where FOM is Figure of Merit and equal to:
FOM = SL - (NL - DI) - DT
By the above equations, FOM is time invariant, and is a simple number
for each unit in each region computed from the specific unit parameters that the
user gives in the platform definition phase. The ambient noise level and the
transmission loss depend exclusively on the environment. Signal Excess is time
variant depending on the range between searcher and target at time t. Also as
convention, signal excess is assumed to have uncertainty, and is a normally
distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation o. ASSET in
the end comes up with a probability of detection function, but puts it all together
by Monte Carlo simulation rather than analytically. The simulation assumes
detection, if and only if actual signal excess exceeds zero.
The propagation loss, or transmission loss is the key to ASSET'S
detection model, and certainly the single most difficult bit of information for the
analyst to pin down. Obtaining transmission loss curves out to one hundred miles
is not easy to do, unless you are shooting to make a cookie cutter detection
model by zeroing out all loss values to the range you desire, and high values from
then on. The need for a complete, accurate transmission loss curve will most
likely require running one of the standard Navy models, such as PE (Parabolic
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Equation) or ASTRAL for range-dependent losses or RAYMODE for range
independent losses. All are now available in some form on personal computers,
such as many shipboard desktop calculators, and are fairly easy to use. For
shallow water transmission loss computations for the 100 hertz to 2.8 kilohertz
range, an empirical model COLOSSUS II is available and is based on some one
hundred thousand observations in waters less than 400 meters deep.
Unfortunately, there are so many caveats in the proper use of the models that it
may require that the analyst gain some degree of expertise in tactical
oceanographic predictions prior to using these models to obtain a transmission
loss curve.
The environmental regions in ASSET are defined to be homogeneous,
having the same transmission loss and ambient noise throughout the region. The
transmission loss curve for a frequency and the ambient noise value are assigned
to a user defined region. There is no variation in bearing, and there is no
relationship to the geographical land mass features. The land, in essence, floats
above the water.
b. Problems in the Passive Sonar Model
As we mentioned in Chapter I, one of the criticisms of ASSET is that
passive sonar is not modeled the way it would be used operationally. The nature
of sonar arrays, especially towed arrays, favor the searcher using the highest
stable frequency available from the source for tracking purposes. This is because
the beamwidth of the array is inversely proportional to frequency monitored.
Therefore, the higher the frequency of interest, the tighter the beamwidth, and the
more accurate the bearing from the tracker. This process results in a flexible
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method of tracking a contact. The target will radiate many frequencies, but it is
the highest stable one that he will be used to track. If that frequency is lost for
some reason, then the next highest stable frequency will be the one used. For
example, assume the target radiates on many tonals, but the signal excess on the
one tonal that is specified in ASSET drops below zero while another remains well
above zero. ASSET will cause the searcher to lose all contact while a human
uacker will simply shift to the other tonal, which although may not be as accurate,
would still let the searcher maintain track. ASSET avoids this shifting process by
allowing only one radiated frequency from the noise source. This assumption
allows the target to be tracked on one frequency at a fixed source level (SL),
thereby keeping the FOM calculation for that target constant.
After the modifications by Peng-tso Chang [Ref. 16], a source's most
detectable frequency was allowed to vary with the environmental region. This
modification was for the better, although still not as good as "real life." Chang's
improvements would allow the track to be resumed if both target and searcher
crossed into a new region, assuming the transmission loss was less than that for
the previous frequency in the previous area.
Optimally for the tracking routine, a whole list of radiated
frequencies could be used to define each platform, and then the environmental
areas would be defined at each frequency for the transmission loss. The argument
at this point becomes how to reflect bearing errors due to the large beamwidths
from tracking at lower frequencies. If this approach of multiple frequencies was
to be used, it may then require the Detection Reports Edit Window to be linked
with the frequency list for that scenario and environmental region.
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Another sketchy implementation in ASSET is the subject of
homogeneous water masses and their relevance in a shallow water environment.
This may be a fine assumption in the open ocean, but it is in error as soon as a ship
is close enough to shore to "see" non-symmetric ambient noise and shallow
water transmission loss effects. Although the user can generate regions of any
size and boundary complexity, the homogenous aspect of the region do not allow
any sort of variable environment. The great advantage of using the standard
Navy transmission loss models is that ASSET does not have to care at all about
bottom types, salinity gradients, or a host of other problems that a range
dependent model could take care of. This is just another application of the
hierarchy of models, applied to a numerical data entry for transmission loss. From
the assumption that the computed transmission loss is accurate and the user has
chosen the correct models, or series of models (and this may be the largest
assumption), we do not have to worry about the "floating land" or changes in
the water transmission characteristics. What becomes very important is the
horizontal directionality for both transmission loss and ambient noise.
Below is Figure 8, showing the transmission loss contours about a
shallow water site. It shows that while we may be able to compute a single
transmission loss along one of the radials, there is little correlation between radials
and they do vary significantly, enough to upset the passive sonar equation,
depending on the direction the ship is listening. Noise level, as stated above, is
the power sum (the sum of two logarithmic levels) of ambient noise and self noise.
Self noise in ASSET is a fixed quantity for a ship, and is a user defined value.
Ambient noise is specified for the water mass in the region definition phase. Like
the transmission loss curves, ambient noise in a shallow water environment is
55
highly variable in a horizontal direction. Figure 9 is a diagram showing the
extreme variability in direction in the middle of the Pacific.
20 TM
IdO PM,
Figure 8. Transmission loss contours about a shallow water site [Ref. 17:p. 182]
*
Unlike transmission loss, ambient noise is not nearly as predictable,
depending on shipping and industrial noise, wind noise and biological noise. At
any given time the combination of these factors will determine the ambient noise
level. There are ambient noise prediction databases, such as DANES, which aid in
the determination of the ambient noise levels. Using this kind of information
would most likely be the only way to determine reasonable estimates as to the
noise level. There is one final consideration in the ambient noise question. Since
shipping noises are a major part of the total noise level, thought must be given to
how this noise would change if there is conflict. An analyst should reasonably
expect to see less major shipping after one or more has been sunk in the area, so
all predictions of ambient noise based .on historical data may be high, as other
ships and pleasure craft exit the area.
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Figure 9. Horizontal Variability in Ambient Noise [Ref. 18:p. 5-21]
The problem remains of how to implement all of these shallow water
considerations. Any correction to the present system will entail much more data
entry just in the most basic assumptions how to model a shallow water
environment. The most equitable solution for an off-shore area may simply be to
take any user defined environmental region and divide it into quadrants as shown
in figure 10, toward the coastline, away from the coastline, and along the coastline
in either direction, and simply use the biggest transmission loss and largest
ambient noise for each quadrant. This division could occur in software where the
course of the submarine, the direction that it is heading, determines the noise field
and transmission loss that its sensors would be subject to. The other method to
implement this division, and the one that would take no manipulation of the code,
would be to physically divide into subregions a desired region into the quadrants,
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and have the user define for each the transmission loss and ambient noise. This
process would, in effect, try to approximate a non-homogeneous region, by
forming it from multiple, different, homogeneous regions. This division would
require that the analyst do a great deal of research into the environment, however,
which could be the sole reason that ASSET would not be used.
LAND
Figure 10. Example of forming quadrants of an acoustic region
A much more simplistic approach would be to define a very narrow
region close to the shore and give in uniformly the worst transmission loss and
largest ambient noise. This would be a "pessimistic" approach to the analysis,
but also would enable simple shallow water modeling without any modifications
to the code. It would also allow the user to perform sensitivity analysis, if desired.
Finally, the problem of depth changes becomes apparent with the
advent of a non-nuclear submarine. In computing the transmission loss curves
using the standard models, it is crucial to define both the target depth and the
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receiver depth and the frequency of analysis. In ASSET these depths make no
difference to the model; all it is concerned with is the transmission loss curve
between the source and receiver. If the simulation is to contain a non-nuclear
submarine that has to change depths, however, consideration has to be given to
other transmission loss curves for the multiple depths. The recharging of the
battery using the diesel engine is the noisiest evolution that a non-nuclear
submarine can perform, and it does so right at the surface, probably within a
surface duct that would allow long range detection by opposing platforms. At a
minimum, for the diesel submarine, computation of transmission losses at both
periscope depth and a transit/attack depth is necessary for proper modeling of
detection for both the submarine and opposing units. Implementation of a depth
changing submarine may require the computation of possibly three transmission
loss curves, one for periscope depth, one for submerged above the layer, and the
last for submerged below the layer. By the principle of reciprocity, the
transmission loss could apply to submarine detection or surface detection
assuming the same frequency is the same in a homogeneous area. Also, a
submarine operating "script" would have to be defined to direct the submarine to
be at particular depths at certain points in its operation.
The bottom line in implementing shallow water losses with a non-
nuclear submarine in the area is that a lot more legwork will be required on the
part of the analyst running the model. Accurate transmission loss curves will
have to be generated using the most applicable oceanographic models available
for both multiple regions off shore and multiple depths for the conventional
submarine. No matter the simulation, if the acoustic detection is required to be
accurately modeled, then the analyst must be willing to forgo simple detection
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models and do a great deal of preparation prior to running the simulation. It can
be done in ASSET, but will not be easy.
2. Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Radar
Much like the police radar warning devices in automobiles, the ESM
receivers onboard ships, submarines and aircraft give the owner a great deal of
information about current threats. Unlike cars though, this information is very
specific, down to signal strength and transmission frequencies. For a submarine
this information could determine life and death, simply by notifying personnel
that a mast such as a periscope may be exposed to air or surface based radar.
According to the 1992-1993 Jane's Fighting Ships, virtually all
submarines carry ESM receivers as a countermeasure to radar, even the old
Foxtrots sold to Libya. From this information, it would be a waste of time to
install a complicated radar detection model, since the searching unit may get one
or two sweeps at most on a periscope and then lose contact. Often the early
warning receivers onboard the submarine would be able to point out operating
radars long before the searcher came within range where he was able to detect a
mast. Even submarines passively copying the broadcast would lower the mast
and try to copy it later. For so few detection opportunities a radar detection
model would be a waste of computational time.
Radar's use for a submarine would not be for detection, but rather for
the detection of surface groups and other submarines, followed by homing in on
the source as a beacon and then attacking when within range. If the assumption
can be safely made that surface formations will not remain in emissions control,
then this method should be entered into ASSET to bring in a legitimate
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vulnerability to surface formations. This process would require assigning a radar
object to surface ships with characteristics of some period of time between
transmissions, the length of transmission and the range to which it could be
detected. The range normally wouldn't be a constant value, but that
approximation would suffice out to the visual horizon of the radiating platform, as
a safe assumption.
B. SURFACE SHIP BASED DETECTION METHODS
The units in a surface formation have to a large extent the same types of
detection systems as submarines, but are very apt to use active sonar for detection
of submarines and possibly radar to pick up an exposed mast. In a regional type
of conflict the low level of noise from diesel submarines will likely force major use
of active systems in a regional type of conflict rather than the traditional passive
systems. This use can both detect and alert the submarine to the possible location
of the surface formation.
The assumption in discussing any sensors on the surface ships is that the
surface formation will be given some interactive capability eventually. This is not
expected to happen due to the complexity of the additions that would be
required. This analysis may be helpful in other contexts, in case ASSET in a
future version or other simulations decide to take up this problem
1. Active Sonar
Active sonar is quite different from the passive systems in ASSET, in
both reality and possible implementation. The form of the equation is similar and
the concept of a transmission loss is the same, but generating a signal to get a
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return adds in many variables including the target strength, which is dependent
on the hull shape and aspect, the noise level in the ocean and the reverberation
level, which are dependent on the power level and the environment.
The active sonar equation is:
SIGNAL EXCESS = SL - 2TL - (NL - DI) - DT + TS
where SL = source level of the noise
TL = one-way transmission loss or propagation loss
NL = noise level at hydrophone
DT = detection threshold
DI = directivity index
TS = target strength
Like the passive sonar equation, active sonar could be treated as a fixed
term, FOM or figure of merit, and a range dependent transmission loss term:
SIGNAL EXCESS(t) = FOM - 2TL(Range(t))
where FOM is Figure of Merit and equal to:
FOM = SL - (NL-DI) - DT + TS
This series of equations are true if the environment is not reverberation
limited, in which case the active sonar equation becomes:
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SIGNAL EXCESS = SL - 2TL - RL - DT + TS
and
FOM = SL - RL - DT + TS
As there are computerized models to predict the transmission loss for the
passive sonar equation, so there are also models for the active portion as well.
ACTIVE RAYMODE, which is range independent, will provide the user not only
with a transmission loss but also estimations into the reverberation levels if
needed. DANES in the noise limited case will still be able to provide the ambient
noise level for the active equation. Detection Threshold, Source Level, and
Directivity Index are all reference values for the particular platform being studied.
To implement an active sonar model in ASSET is going to require either
extreme simplification in the model by using circular probabilities of detection or a
great deal of off line analysis and preparation by the user. The big variables in the
passive sonar equation were the transmission loss and the ambient noise. In the
active equation, transmission loss, ambient noise, reverberation noise, and target
strength are all variables and positionally dependent. Also, a ship may be
reverberation limited in a bottom bounce mode, but may be noise limited in a
direct path mode. It is easy to make passive assumptions, but active assumptions
may be more far reaching.
Target strength is dependent not only on the size and distance of the
target, but also on the aspect of the target. Figure 11 is an example of a
"butterfly" diagram which shows aspect dependence on target strength. Some
assumption would have to be made on target strength since ASSET is not
concerned with tactical details. One approach may be to make target strength a
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normal random variable about the bow aspect target strength, with the built in
assumption of a closing submarine trying to minimize its sonar return.
Figure 11. "Butterfly" pattern of the aspect variation of submarine target
strength [Ref. 19:p. 311]
Determination of noise limited performance and ambient limited
performance in a shallow water environment may simply be too complex for the
simulation. Like passive sonar, going active toward a shoaling coastline will
produce a much different signal excess than in a homogeneous deep water
environment, due in part to reverberation, and in part to transmission loss.
For the user this will mean that to implement active sonar, certain
sacrifices may have to be made. The user can analyze the scenario using the
worst case target strength, transmission loss curve, and reverberation limited noise
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in a specific transmission mode in a certain user-defined region. The values for
these variables which he can obtained from the standard Navy models, and the
simulation can be repeated changing the values to derive some feel for the
sensitivity of the variables. To input more than one set of active sonar data per
user defined region may confuse the user in worst case analysis, and just bog
down the process of getting the simulation up and running.
2. Radar
As mentioned in the submarine model, there is no real need for a radar
detection model based on dying to catch a submarine at periscope depth if it has
some degree of charge in the battery. While there may be specific radar search
plans that allow surface formations to detect non-nuclear submarines in a more
covert fashion, if the submarine tries to maintain a war footing and uses mast
discipline and does not snorkel in enemy occupied areas, then gains from radar
use will be minimized. All the submarine has to do is lower the mast, removing the
object that can be detected, and move away. Where a detection should occur is
in a scenario where an exhausted battery in a conventional submarine may force
a snorkeling operation within the detection range of either ship or aircraft. In
such a case, it would be reasonable to assume that if the submarine were required
to snorkel within some user defined detection range for the radar, then either the
encounter process should be forced to begin at that point, or simply treat the
submarine as sunk. Since the submarine will be limited to near surface operations
by the diesel operation, the submarine's position would be quickly determined,
and snorkeling within the radar detection range should be treated as a kill for a
surface formation with ASW offensive capability. If the surface formation does
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not have the periscope radar, the submarine should be allowed to snorkel at
leisure, at least until it comes within range of some detecting platform. If the
group has the radar but no weapons, then a message should be sent on the C3I
network.
3. Electronic Support Measures
Much as the submarine needs an ESM receiver to determine the level of
threat to its safety, surface ships also benefit from the presence of such ESM
receivers. Unfortunately, the only real threat in ASSET to the surface formation is
the opposing submarine, which is unlikely to radiate on the radar. What the
submarine will do is to communicate when it has a contact to report. This is now
detectable in ASSET by HFDF sensors and ELINT satellites, but if the surface
formation were to eventually gain interactive capabilities, a sensor object keyed
to listen for this transmission would be required. The result would be a detection
report from the surface unit, exactly the same as that from the HFDF network or
ELINT satellites.
C. MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT DETECTION METHODS
The MPA is one of the more potent threats to the submarine, not only
because of the multitude of sensors carried onboard, but also because if its high
speed relative to the submarine. This platform, more than any other has become
the test bed for many of the nonacoustic detection methods used in the U.S.
Navy because of the areas that it can sweep out by both altitude and speed.
Some of the nonacoustic systems that we see aircraft obtaining include Magnetic
Anomaly Detection (MAD), periscope detecting radar, lidar, and bioluminescence.
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It is still the acoustic systems that the aircraft rely on for the large area detection
however.
1. Sonobuoys
Sonobuoys constitute the major focus of the acoustic detection method
that aircraft employ. These sonobuoys come in both passive and active types,
and are designed to operate in patterns to maximize both detection opportunities
and directionality of the buoys. The buoys themselves have a fairly large
beamwidths, so the patterns become necessary to localize the submarine in a
large general area. ASSET only models sonobuoys by passive fields of uniformly
placed buoys. Any advantage of these tactical patterns is negated. Richard
Shaffer covered and made suggestions for improvement in his thesis at NPS [Ref.
20].
Active sonobuoys, used mostly for a final localization after passive
detection in order to attack, are complex in terms of where to drop, when to drop,
and how deep to drop at. These buoys could act as active sonar objects that
would detect submarines after the passive localization. Data entry at this point
becomes laborious for the analyst for a process used only in final localization, and
a sacrifice in computational speed would likely be suffered for a model that is not
necessary.
2. Nonacoustic Sensors
As we mentioned, nonacoustic sensors are a big part of aircraft
operations from mostly radar and MAD. Lidar and bioluminescence detection
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systems are not deployed yet although they will form two new major means of
submarine confirmation.
All of these methods are good up to a point, and are used to accurately
fix the position of the submarine prior to launching a weapon for a submarine kill.
Since these methods are not generally effective until after the submarine has been
localized to a specific area by the passive buoy methods, these methods are also
cumbersome in the modeling process. For limited modeling controls, the
installation of large sections of code for results that could be incorporated into
the MPA - submarine Pk's is a waste of time for both the programmer and the
computer, not to mention the user who must obtain hard to get information such
as magnetic moments and water clarity measurements.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
Three subjects have been covered of the utmost importance in upgrading
ASSET: the conventional submarine, the surface group and its ability to interact
in the model, and the addition of active sonar and ESM in detection methods.
1. The Conventional Submarine
The conventional submarine is very different from the nuclear submarine
in vulnerabilities, capabilities, operating regions, and tactical employment. To
model the conventional submarine using the nuclear submarine model would
overestimate its power plant and give it the ability to remain indefinitely
submerged, only coming to periscope depth for communication reasons. If a
simple indiscretion rate model is used, i.e. going to periscope depth to snorkel
some fixed percentage of time, then no consideration is given to the limitations of
the battery at a number of different speeds. The heart of the conventional
submarine is its power plant. The battery output characteristics must be the first
priority in modeling, and from this the detection and communication capabilities
can be determined.
A simple model for the power plant operations was proposed in Chapter
II based on actual performance specifications from the Type 209 (1200). The
speed versus submerged time curve was normalized to remove the specifics of
that particular submarine. Other speed versus submerged time curves for other
submarines can be obtained by reversing the process with the specifications of
the desired submarines.
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2. The Surface Group
The surface model in the initial version of ASSET is inadequate.
Presently, all that occurs is a submarine detects the group, the submarine moves
into a user defined critical range, fires a portion of its weapons and then moves
away. The surface group has no chance to detect first, and no reaction to this
attack, not even after a sinking or being alerted to the presence of a submarine in
the area. The submarine may move in for a re-attack, if it re-detects the group.
The measure of effectiveness of this approach is how many times the submarine
reaches the critical range. In this attack, move away, re-attack, move away
scenario the MOE is a useless statistic. As many analysts have pointed out, some
other method of interaction between the submarine and the surface group must
be produced.
ASSET needs at least rudimentary capability of the surface group to
defend itself, communicate with ASW assets, and if all else fails, to vanish when
sunk. The ability to communicate in an encounter would be fairly straightforward
to incorporate. Attrition of units is much more difficult, and there are not many
ways to accomplish this. The first method would be to use data from the lower
level engagement models to determine the outcome of the interactions. In this
way, submarines and surface ships can be sunk, and determination of damage to
high value units can be ascertained. The assumption is that the submarine would
always would detect the surface unit first and the surface unit would be in a
primarily ASW defensive mode. The problem is finding an adequate lower level
model, giving it all the relevant data for the encounter and then extracting the
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statistics needed for ASSET. Even these results may need to tabulated for ASSET
to take into account the many variations such as approach angle.
The second method would be to model each unit in the formation, and
have them all under the control of a senior object like the MPA's ASWOC. Each
unit would have detection capabilities, communication capabilities, and could be
sunk. The unrealistic part would be in mutual acoustic interference, a need for
formation deployable MPA to form the outer screen, and finally one-on-one Pk's
to resolve individual combat.
The third method would be to keep the surface formation an aggregate
unit, much as it is now, but give it collective offensive and defensive capabilities
of the formation including detection capabilities. This grouping would be
difficult to fix values on; surface force detection range alone would have to be a
simple cookie-cutter model since it would take a study unto itself to determine
multi-unit detection range for specific environmental and operational conditions.
Finally, the fourth and easiest method would be to leave the formation
almost as it is, but change the code to end an iteration when a submarine reaches
the critical encounter range to the formation, thereby ducking the issue of the
group's response. This again assumes that the submarine make the initial contact,
but avoids the need to put in any other modifications such as communication,
detection, evasion or sinkings. This simple fix has many weaknesses, for example,
if there were multiple surface formations in the scenario, but might give ASSET
some utility for campaign analysis.
The solution to ASSET'S interaction problem is to simply give the user a
choice of the two best and easiest fixes: either stop an iteration when the first
detection occurs between the submarine and the surface group, and record the
71
pertinent data, or have the user define the surface group with the pertinent
questions as to it ASW strengths and vulnerabilities listed in Chapter III. Both
ought to be implemented within ASSET, with the user telling the program's
umpire which way he desires to go. The modifications to the code should be
slight, with a good amount of flexibility added in with little work.
3. Alternate Methods of Detection
Each type of unit has a preferred method of detection that it uses to find
opposing platforms, and currently all happen to be forms of passive acoustics.
There are significant other means of detection that should be considered though
to make the campaign simulation more realistic.
For submarines, the major sensors are the passive hull arrays and
possibly towed arrays. The submarine uses these almost exclusively. It almost
never uses its active detection capabilities for fear of counterdetection by an
enemy. The passive model needs some improvement to allow it to model a
shallow water environment, including assumptions regarding how to treat
variability in ambient noise and transmission loss. The submarine can also monitor
the electromagnetic spectrum passively through ESM receivers in the periscope,
which in most cases would void the use of radar by aircraft and ships for
submarine detection. What the ESM receiver will do for the submarine is to allow
it to follow a bearing into a surface formation or submarine that may happen to be
radiating. If one assumes that a battle group cannot remain under constant
emissions control (which is especially possible in night carrier landing operations),
then a submarine can use its ESM receiver to home in.
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The surface ships, while using primarily passive acoustics now, will most
likely find that against a small quiet submarine on the battery, active sonar is the
only feasible way to search or screen. While detection may be complicated by a
shallow water environment, the active model is a necessary addition since that
may be the only detection method that actually provides a reasonable detection
opportunity. Unfortunately, due to the many variables in active sonar that do not
exist in passive sonar, the best that can be done is worst case analysis for a region,
with the worst transmission loss, target strength, and noise level assigned to the
entire region. The incorporation of any sort of horizontal variability within a
region would be too hard to collect the data for and would likely confuse the
analyst and the analysis.
Radar is unnecessary in the surface ship model since it is unlikely that
with a good ESM receiver, the submarine is going to allow itself to be detected
with proper mast management procedures. There is some need for a model that
would show that the ship had a radar energized however, since this signal could
be detected and tracked to lead the submarine to the surface formation.
Implementation of this could be as simple as setting a flag at some user defined
interval to represent power to the radar, and then have all submarines that are in a
certain range move directly toward the signal with some error thrown in for
bearing accuracy.
The Maritime Patrol Aircraft have a good number of sensors onboard
including the sonobuoys, magnetic anomaly detection, and Lidar in the future.
The best sensors in terms of the widest area searched are the acoustic ones, and
the others mainly assist in localization and attack. MAD and Lidar are simply not
worth the trouble to alter the code for, since they are or would be used for
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confirmation prior to weapons release. Computation and data would be required
involving magnetic fields, orientations of ships, altitudes, water clarity, source
power levels and a host of other details, that may be too hard to find.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ASSET, despite its many documented weaknesses here and in other reports, is
still quite a complete program for a Monte-Carlo simulation dealing with the huge
subject of campaign-level ASW. It is very thorough, but in a Soviet-U.S.
confrontational context in deep oceans, with land simply as a reference. The
program needs to be brought up to date, if possible, to reflect the conflicts that
would face forces in the future and the environment in which the battle would
occur.
The central question is whether ASSET is worth updating. The ASW threat
from numerous SSNs and SSGNs has not disappeared. We should know the risks
that our power projection platforms such as carriers, cruisers, and amphibious
ships will face with this kind of threat when they go in harm's way. Campaign
simulations such as ASSET can theoretically provide us with an indication of the
level of the threat that we may face. ASSET, through its implementation on a
personal computer, and its flexibility to study almost any part of the world, makes
it a good candidate for use in that kind of role.
Its limitations, especially in littoral operations against non-nuclear submarines,
are daunting, however. Unless the near land ocean environment is loaded into
the program in great detail, the major focus of this program, detection, including
active sonar detection, will not be very accurate. Operations in quiet, deep
homogeneous water is ASSET'S strength and we are unlikely to be at risk there
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for at least the near future. Temperature, salinity, and ambient noise will all vary
greatly in bearing from a position just off shore. If a subroutine could be added
that would give an accurate depiction of the shallow environment, with help from
the Navy oceanographic models then ASSET may be worth saving. The tracking
and communications networks and processes are nice, but are secondary to doing
the best possible to model the environment in which our forces would have to
fight. Likewise, the surface group-submarine interactions and the diesel
submarine model suggested here are desirable, but since the vulnerability of
operations and interactions hinge on detection ability of opposing units, these
models are also secondary considerations to environmental modeling.
Many of the analysts desire nothing more than a cookie cutter model for the
ships. That may do the job for simple models, but in a complicated environment, a
complicated model for the environment would be required. ASSET should
provide both for ease of use, but the heart of the program should be a quality
detection routine.
Lisp is generally a difficult language, and ASSET'S modularity is in question
based on it being simply too hard to program. If ASSET was shifted to object
oriented Pascal or C/C+/C++, then the program could be easily ported to other
types of machines and altered to suit individual needs. As it stands now, the
program will most likely only receive updates through theses at the Naval
Postgraduate School from students intrepid enough to want to wrestle with the
code.
In sum, ASSET needs a major overhaul to reflect the threats that are to be
faced in the future. Its results are extremely suspect for a surface group going
close to a coast, encountering conventional submarines there or along the way.
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The three major subjects of this sample study, the surface group, the conventional
submarine, and the methods of detection in a shallow environment, are all
incompletely modeled and if not updated will limit the usefulness of ASSET. If
these changes can be made with a reasonable amount of effort and without a
great deal of compromise, then ASSET will be of use. Otherwise, it may be wise to
build a new model that structures the program to the scenarios in which the U.S.
Navy's ASW forces will be employed the most frequently.
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